In recent years, cyber-attacks against individuals, businesses, and organizations have increased. Cyber criminals are always looking for effective vectors to deliver malware to victims in order to launch an attack. Images are used on a daily basis by millions of people around the world, and most users consider images to be safe for use; however, some types of images can contain a malicious payload and perform harmful actions. JPEG is the most popular image format, primarily due to its lossy compression. It is used by almost everyone, from individuals to large organizations, and can be found on almost every device (on digital cameras and smartphones, websites, social media, etc.). Because of their harmless reputation, massive use, and high potential for misuse, JPEG images are used by cyber criminals as an attack vector. While machine learning methods have been shown to be effective at detecting known and unknown malware in various domains, to the best of our knowledge, machine learning methods have not been used particularly for the detection of malicious JPEG images. In this paper, we present MalJPEG, the first machine learningbased solution tailored specifically at the efficient detection of unknown malicious JPEG images. MalJPEG statically extracts 10 simple yet discriminative features from the JPEG file structure and leverages them with a machine learning classifier, in order to discriminate between benign and malicious JPEG images. We evaluated MalJPEG extensively on a real-world representative collection of 156,818 images which contains 155,013 (98.85%) benign and 1,805 (1.15%) malicious images. The results show that MalJPEG, when used with the LightGBM classifier, demonstrates the highest detection capabilities, with an area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC) of 0.997, true positive rate (TPR) of 0.951, and a very low false positive rate (FPR) of 0.004.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber attacks targeting individuals, businesses, and organizations have increased in recent years. Infosecurity magazine declared that cyber attacks doubled in 2017. 1 Cyber attacks usually include harmful activities such as stealing confidential information, spying, or monitoring, and cause harm (sometimes significant) to the victim. Attackers may be motivated by ideology, criminal intent, a desire for publicity, etc.
Attackers are constantly searching for new and effective ways to launch attacks and deliver a malicious payload to The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Inês Domingues . 1 https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/cyberattacks-doubled-in-2017/ victims. Files sent via the Internet have often served as a means of accomplishing this. Since executable files (i.e., * .exe) are known to be dangerous, attackers are increasingly using non-executable files (e.g., * .pdf, * .docx, etc.) which are mistakenly considered to be safe for use by most users. Some non-executable files allow an attacker to run arbitrary malicious code on the targeted victim machine when the file is opened.
JPEG (Joint Photographic Experts Group) is the most popular image format, 2 mainly because of its lossy compression. JPEG images are used by almost everyone, from individuals to large enterprises, and on various platforms. JPEG images can be found on computers (personal images, documents), devices (smartphones, digital cameras, etc.), and in cyber space (emails, social media, websites, etc.). Due to their harmless reputation, massive use, and high potential for misuse, cyber criminals use JPEG images as an attack vector in order to deliver their malicious payload to the victim device.
At the 2015 Black Hat conference, Saumil Shah demonstrated 3 how to create malicious JPEG images that can be loaded in a browser in order to execute malicious code automatically. 4, 5 In November 2016, it was reported that attackers used Facebook Messenger to spread the infamous Locky ransomware via JPEG images. 6 The malware authors discovered security vulnerabilities in Facebook and LinkedIn that allow them to forcibly download a malicious image on the victim's computer. In August 2017, it was reported that SyncCrypt ransomware was spread using JPEG images. 7 In December 2018, Trend Micro, 8 an enterprise cyber security company, reported that cyber criminals used memes on Twitter(JPEG images) in order to convey commands to malware. 9 Recently, in December 2019, researchers from the Sophos security company published a comprehensive report 10 on the MyKings cryptomining botnet that lurks behind a seemingly innocuous JPEG of Taylor Swift.
The ability to detect malicious JPEG images has great importance as JPEG images are widely used by individuals and businesses. Existing endpoint defense solutions which are based on signatures (e.g., antivirus), can only detect known malware based on their signature database. When a new malware, or new variant of existing malware appears, there is a time lag until these defense solutions update their clients with the new signature-a time in which the clients are vulnerable to the new malware. In contrast, in recent years, machine learning (ML) algorithms have demonstrated their ability to detect both known and unknown malware in various domains, particularly for the detection of malware in various types of files [1] - [7] . However, to the best of our knowledge, machine learning methods have not been employed for the detection of malicious JPEG images.
In this paper, we present MalJPEG, a machine learningbased solution for efficient detection of unknown malicious JPEG images. MalJPEG extracts 10 simple but discriminative features from the JPEG file structure and leverages them with a machine learning classifier, in order to discriminate between benign and malicious JPEG images. We evaluate MalJPEG extensively on a real-world representative collec-3 https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-15/materials/eu-15-Shah-Stegosploit-Exploit-Delivery-With-Steganography-And-Polyglots.pdf 4 https://www.opswat.com/blog/hacking-pictures-stegosploit-and-howstop-it 5 https://www.opswat.com/blog/image-borne-malware-how-viewingimage-can-infect-device 6 https://thehackernews.com/2016/11/facebook-locky-ransomware.html 7 https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/synccryptransomware-hides-inside-jpg-files-appends-kk-extension/ 8 https://www.trendmicro.com 9 https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-securityintelligence/cybercriminals-use-malicious-memes-that-communicatewith-malware/ 10 https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/pdfs/technicalpapers/sophoslabs-uncut-mykings-report.pdf tion of benign and malicious JPEG images. We also compare MalJPEG features to features extracted using several existing generic feature extraction methods.
The paper's contributions are as follows: 1) MalJPEG -a machine learning based solution for efficient detection of known and unknown malicious JPEG images. 2) MalJPEG features -a compact set of 10 simple yet discriminative features for the efficient detection of malicious JPEG images using machine learning techniques.
3) The creation of a large and representative labeled collection of benign and malicious JPEG images that can be used for further research by the scientific community. We provide background information related to the JPEG file format in Section II and discuss related work in Section III. Section IV describes the methods used in this research and the MalJPEG features. We evaluate our method and present the results in Section V. We discuss the results and various aspects of security and present our conclusions in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide background material related to our research, as well as technical information regarding the structure of a JPEG image. Since the JPEG file structure is complicated, we only present the basic information needed to enable the reader to comprehend the paper and understand the proposed MalJPEG solution presented in this research. The format of JPEG images is comprehensively described in the JPEG File Interchange Format (JFIF) specification. 11 marker (APP 0 ). A JPEG image ends with 0xFFD9 (EOI-end of image). Figure 1 presents the hexadecimal view of a sample JPEG image file; the bold bytes are the markers. JPEG image files primarily use two classes of segments: marker segments and entropy-coded segments. Marker segments contain general information (metadata) such as header information and tables (quantization tables, entropy-coding tables, etc.) required to interpret and decode the compressed image data. Entropy-coded segments contain the entropycoded data (follows the SOS marker). The compressed content inside a JPEG image is placed inside a sequence of units called a frame. A frame is a collection of one or more scanunits. Ascan contains a complete encoding of one or more image components. 12 Figure 2 presents the structure of a simple JPEG image file and the hierarchy of the markers and their division into frames and scans. The markers in bold are mandatory or the most common markers.
A. JPEG FILE STRUCTURE

B. EMBEDDING MALICIOUS PAYLOAD IN JPEG IMAGES
Vulnerability Exploitation -No software is ever completely protected, and it is almost impossible to prevent the presence of vulnerabilities during the development of a large-scale software project. Such vulnerabilities, when exploited, can allow an adversary to obtain higher privileges or divert the normal execution flow to an arbitrary malicious code.
In addition, in order to view/parse a JPEG image, a viewer/parser program is required, and these programs may have some vulnerabilities. Many vulnerabilities related to JPEG images have been discovered since it was first published, and there are currently 303 known vulnerabilities 13 (CVE -Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures), and 5,520 known related security issues 14 associated with JPEG images. For example, a recently discovered vulnerability (CVE-2018-6612) may allow a remote attacker to cause a denial-of-service when the victim processes a malicious JPEG file. 15 Steganography (steganos -covered, graphie -writing) -Steganography, 16 a technique used for disguising information (e.g., text or malicious code) inside the image without affecting its appearance (invisible to the human eye) is very difficult to detect. Steganography can be used to exfiltrate sensitive information from the victim's host or network via JPEG images and can even be used for delivering pieces of code into the victim's host or network under the guise of a simple benign JPEG image.
It is important to emphasize that malicious JPEG images do not necessarily use steganography methods to conceal the embedded payload; thus, we discriminate between JPEG images that carry hidden information using steganography and JPEG images that carry a malicious payload. In this research, we focus only on the later and the detection of malicious JPEG images, and not on steganography detection.
III. RELATED WORK
The main domain of this research is malware detection using machine learning. Many studies have already been performed on malware detection in various operating systems and file types for both executable and non-executable files. For example, [6] , [5] , [8] - [12] proposed solutions for the detection of malware in executable files using machine learning. In 2019, [13] presented a survey of machine learning techniques for malware analysis in Windows portable executables (PEs). They reviewed previous work considering the objective of the analysis, the feature extraction technique used (static, dynamic, or hybrid analysis), the type of features extracted from samples, and the machine learning models used. In 2019, [14] presented a comprehensive, state-of-theart survey of existing methods for the dynamic malware analysis of PE files, including machine learning-based methods. With regard to non-executable files, [4] , [7] , [15] - [18] proposed ML-based solutions for the detection of malicious PDF documents; [1] , [2] , [19] proposed ML-based solutions for the detection of malicious Office documents; [20] proposed an ML-based solution for the detection of malicious SWF (Flash) files; and [3] proposed an ML-based solution for the detection of malicious emails.
In the course of this research we sought out related work aimed at the detection of malicious images, and JPEG images in particular, using machine learning. However, we were unable to find any papers that apply machine learning for the detection of malicious JPEG images. It is important to emphasize that we only refer to images that contain malware or malicious code as malicious images. Therefore, the domain of adversarial image detection (e.g., [21] - [25] ) is different than this paper's domain. The difference between adversarial images and malicious images lies in the part of the images that is altered to transform an original image into an adversarial or malicious image. Adversarial images are created by intentionally designing the pixels of the original image in such a way that the image will be misclassified by a machine learning model. In contrast, malicious JPEG images store the malicious mechanism in some metadata fields which are outside the pixels section; usually in this case, the pixels are not changed in order to maintain the image's authenticity.
Kunwar et al. [26] , proposed a theoretical framework that is aimed to detect the presence of data or code in JPEG images (without the use of machine learning). Their framework has three phases: 1) steganography analysis, 2) extraction of the embedded file, and 3) uploading the extracted file to an online scanning tool such as VirusTotal 17 or Metascan. 18 The paper does not, however, describe any experiments performed in order to evaluate the framework or present any detection results on a real-world dataset. In addition, we identified a study [27] , which proposed an authentication method for JPEG images that can distinguish legitimate operations (e.g., compression) from malicious operations. However, ''malicious'' in the context of this paper does not mean that that image carries malicious code as a payload, but rather that the image is not authentic and that it has been manipulated. In addition, the paper does not apply machine learning methods.
Most of the papers we found on JPEG images focused on steganography methods [28] - [31] , steganography analysis (steganalysis) methods [32] - [36] , or adversarial images [37] - [41] . However, this paper focuses on the detection of malicious JPEG images. To the best of our knowledge, machine learning methods have not been used for the detection of malicious JPEG images, and thus we are the first to propose a machine learning-based solution tailored specifically for the detection of malicious JPEG images.
IV. METHODS
In this section, we describe the methods used in this research. We begin by presenting MalJPEG's features as well as the existing generic feature extraction methods. We then compare the features extracted by the existing generic feature extraction methods and the features extracted by the MalJPEG feature extractor. Finally, we describe the machine learning algorithms we used in this research.
A. MalJPEG SOLUTION
In this section, we present the core contribution of our paper, the MalJPEG machine learning-based solution for the detection of malicious JPEG images. MalJPEG receives a JPEG image as input {1}. The MalJPEG feature extractor {2} extracts the proposed features into a vector of features {3}. The MalJPEG feature extractor inspects the file statically, without actually viewing the image (which requires executing image viewer software that itself might have a vulnerability), and traverses through the JPEG image file structure in order to extract the features. The features are then transferred to a pretrained machine learning-based model {4} which outputs a classification (benign/malicious) {5} for the input image. We implemented MalJPEG and its inner modules, the feature extractor {3} and machine learning model, {4} in Java programming language. The next section provides a detailed description of the features that are extracted using MalJPEG.
1) MalJPEG FEATURES
In this section, we present the compact set of discriminative features extracted by MalJPEG. We engineered these features after manually examining the structure of many benign and malicious JPEG images. We gained an understanding of how attackers use JPEG images in order to launch attacks and how it affects the JPEG file structure. We also found how malicious JPEG images differ from regular benign JPEG images in terms of file structure. For example, some malicious JPEG files contain data (usually code) after the end-of-file (EOI) marker. In addition, we statistically analyzed the distribution for JPEG markers' frequency and size in both malicious and benign JPEG images and define features that primarily discriminate between benign and malicious JPEG images.
The features are very simple, and most of them are based on the presence and size of specific markers within the JPEG image file structure. In addition, the features are relatively easy to extract statically (without actually presenting the image) when parsing the JPEG image file. Table 2 contains the set of MalJPEG features; the features are sorted by their Information Gain [42] rank so that the first feature is the most prominent. Note that, all of the features are numeric.
Information Gain ranks a feature (attribute) by measuring the reduction in entropy of a given set after dividing it based on a specific feature; this results in the gain of information as a result of using the feature. Specifically, it subtracts the weighted entropies of each subset from the original entropy of the entire set. The entropy characterizes the disorder in an arbitrary set of instances. If the set is completely homogeneous, the entropy is zero; if the set is equally divided, then it has entropy of one. Information Gain assigns a higher rank to features that contribute significantly to discrimination between malicious and benign classes. IV-B presents the formula of the entropy of a set of items S divided into C subsets (classes). p i represents the probability of class C in a set of items. Equation 1 presents the Information Gain formula for feature F in a set of items S where V is the set of possible values of A.
A malicious JPEG image carries the malicious payload within itself in some way. Therefore, some of the proposed features are indicative of the maximal size of specific markers (e.g., DHT, DQT, COM, APP1, APP12) that are used by attackers to store the malicious payload. The injection of a payload into a marker increases its size beyond the typical size. In some cases, the malicious payload is spread across multiple markers. Therefore, the reset of the features are indicative of the frequency of specific markers in the file.
An attempt to make a benign file malicious will affect the structure of the image file and thus will be reflected in the selected features. It is important to mention that it is possible that future attack techniques applied on malicious JPEG images will use markers that are not covered by MalJPEG features. Such attacks will likely still affect the structure of the image file and therefore be reflected in the existing selected features which cover the most important markers. In any case, the MalJPEG feature extractor is extendable and can easily be updated to extract new features representative of any other marker in the image file that may be found to be important in the future. Figure 4 presents a histogram of the values of the 'Marker_DQT_num' feature (numeric) among the benign and malicious classes. The x-axis represents the number of DQT markers (bin size = 10) in an image, and the y-axis represents the percentage of images from the class (benign or malicious) that fall in that bin. It can be seen that the distribution is completely different for benign and malicious classes, and this is most noticeable when looking at the range of the values. In addition, 99.21% of the benign images have between zero and nine DQT markers, whereas only 13.74% of the malicious images have between zero and nine DQT markers, and 38.49% of them have between 10,200 and 10,209 DQT markers. In Figure 4 we can see that the DQT marker is much more prevalent in malicious images than in benign images. The DQT marker is, in fact, used by attackers to store the malicious payload. Therefore, the 'Marker_DQT_num' feature is prominent and assists in differentiating between benign and malicious images. Figure 5 presents a heat map of the Pearson correlation matrix of MalJPEG features; low correlation is cooler, and high correlation is warmer. Each cell inside the matrix represents the correlation between two features; a correlation is a number between zero and one. One can see that there are no redundant features and that in general, the features are not highly correlated with each other. Although the features (Marker_DHT_num, File_marker_num, and Marker_DQT_num) have correlation scores between 0.76 and 0.78, each of them still hold additional valuable information that benefits the machine learning classifier; thus, they are all necessary. The average correlation between the features (the lower triangle under the diagonal) is 0.267.
B. GENERIC FEATURE EXTRACTION METHODS
In this section, we present generic and static feature extraction methods that were used in previous academic work in conjunction with machine learning for malware detection. The advantage of generic feature extraction methods is that they model the contents of a file in a file-format agnostic way. Generic feature extraction methods can be applied on any file format, in contrast to the MalJPEG feature extractor which is tailored to JPEG images. Generic feature extraction methods work on the file's building blocks (byte or character representation) in order to extract features that represent the file. It is important to clarify that we did not apply the generic methods on pixel values (although it is possible to do so), because the pixels only hold the image's visual properties of the file but lack the file's metadata. In general, malicious content that is injected into an image by an attacker is stored in the file's metadata; thus, it is important to inspect the JPEG file as a whole, and not only part of it.
1) HISTOGRAM
A histogram feature extractor creates a fixed-size histogram, built according to the file's content; the histogram values can be used as features for machine learning algorithms. In this research, we use two types of histograms: a simple histogram and an advanced byte entropy histogram.
Two simple histogram configurations are used: 1) a histogram on byte values (256 options), and 2) a histogram on character values (128 options, for basic ASCII encoding). The histogram actually counts the frequency of byte or char values in the file. In order to be able to compare files of different sizes, we normalize the histogram values between zero and one.
We also use the byte entropy histogram technique which was used for malware detection in prior research [43] , [44] . In order to extract the byte entropy histogram, we slide a K -size byte window, with a stride of S bytes, over the byte array representation of a file. For each window, we compute the base 2 entropy of the window. We store each individual byte value in the window (K non-unique values) with the entropy value of the whole window (as a pair) in a list; in total, there are K pairs for each window. Finally, we compute a two-dimensional histogram over the pair list, where the histogram entropy axis has E evenly sized bins over the range [0, E], and the byte axis has B evenly sized bins over the range [0, B]. To obtain a feature vector (rather than the matrix), we concatenate each row vector in this histogram into a single E * B sized feature vector. Usually, B is set to 256 (the number of unique byte values), and E is set to 8, 16, or 256. The intuition behind the byte entropy histogram approach is that it represents byte values in the entropy context.
2) MIN-HASH
Min-Hash [45] is a technique for quickly estimating how similar two items are. The Min-Hash method generates an N -size signature for a given file based on N simple hash functions (fuzzy hashing). The similarity of two items can be easily computed by calculating the Hamming distance between their signatures; the more matched signatures, the lower the Hamming distance. The signature created by the Min-Hash technique can be used as an input feature for lazy machine learning algorithms which are based on a distance function (e.g., K-Nearest Neighbors).
Min-Hash signs a file (generates a signature) based on shingles extracted from the file. A shingle is a fixed length sequence of basic units in the file (e.g., byte, char, etc.). A basic way of extracting shingles is to slide a W -size window, with a stride of S, over the file. N hash functions are applied on each shingle extracted from a file, and the hash results (Long type) are stored on an N -size array. The signature of the file is actually an N -size vector of Long numbers, which contains only the minimal hash value produced by each hash function, across all shingles. Min-Hash is initialized with the following parameters: the shingle size W , stride S, and number of hash functions N .
The Min-Hash method is very efficient in terms of time and space. Any file, of any size, can be easily converted to an N -size signature. The Min-Hash method has previously been used for malware detection [46] - [49] and malware clustering [50] .
C. MACHINE LEARNING ALGORITHMS
We applied machine learning classification algorithms on the datasets described in the previous section. In our experiments, we utilized the following commonly used, high performing classic and nonlinear machine learning classifiers: Decision Tree, Random Forest, and Gradient Boosting on Decision Trees (XGBoost and LightGBM). We chose these classifiers as they perform well on highly imbalanced datasets. In is important to mention that in our preliminary experiments we examined classifiers from families other than the decision tree family, such as Logistic Regression and Naïve Bayes, however they did not provide reasonable results; therefore, we did not include them in our evaluation.
In addition, we used the K-Nearest Neighbors classifier (K = 5) on Min-Hash datasets, because it is the only classifier that can actually compare Min-Hash signatures using the Hamming distance function. We chose to u.
We applied the abovementioned machine learning classifiers with Python using the following packages: scikitlearn, 19 XGBoost, 20 and LightGBM. 21 We used the default configuration for all classifiers.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate MalJPEG. We begin by presenting our data collection which we used for evaluation, and then describe the dataset creation process. Then, we present our research questions, evaluation metrics, experimental design, and results.
A. DATA COLLECTION
We obtained a large collection of unique benign and malicious JPEG images. The benign images were collected from social media (Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, etc.); we focus on viral images of different file sizes and on different topics (memes, food, personal photos from social media, etc.). We verified that the images are benign by scanning them using VirusTotal. We make the assumption that these images do not contain unknown threats. The malicious images were collected from VirusTotal. We only used JPEG images that were labeled as malicious by at least five (out of 69) antivirus engines. We set our threshold at five, a level that we feel is sufficient for determining whether a file is malicious for the following reasons. 1) Antivirus engines primarily rely on known signatures of malware and have zero false positives; if a malware signature is found in a file, the file almost certainly contains malware. When combining five different reliable antivirus engines, the certainty increases. 2) A threshold of five was also used in previous research in the field of malware detection [51] - [53] . The query we used to retrieve malicious JPEG images from VirusTotal is: 'p:5+ and (type:jpeg) fs:2016-01-01+'. This query searches VirusTotal for JPEG files uploaded since the beginning of 2016 that were labeled as malicious by at least five antivirus engines. Additional information on VirusTotal search modifiers can be found on their website. 22 We verified that all of the files in our collection were actual images using an automated code that we wrote which verifies that a file has JPEG characteristics. Our collection includes 156,818 images in total: 155,013 (98.9%) benign and 1,805 (1.15%) malicious, which were collected between 2016 and 2018.
Note that the percentage of malicious images in our collection is extremely low (1.15%). We prepared our collection that way intentionally, so that the collection reflects (as much as possible) the ratio between malicious and benign JPEG images in the real world. According to Moskovitch [54] who dealt with the issue of imbalanced collections in the cyber security domain, the most realistic detection performance is achieved when the percentage of malicious files in the training set is equal to the percentage in the real world. Note also that the extremely low percentage of malicious instances (positive) in the collection makes the detection of malicious images extremely difficult. Figure 6 presents the distribution of threats in our malicious JPEG image collection, in a pie chart, sorted from the most common threat included in the collection to the most uncommon threat. We derived the specific type of threat for each malicious file by inspecting the identification provided by different antivirus engines from the VirusTotal report for each file. As can be seen, our malicious JPEG dataset contain a diverse range of threats. 36% of the images use an Iframe HTML tag for malicious purposes, 26% contain malicious PHP code, 10% contain a Trojan, 6% use JavaScript code, 6% exploit some vulnerability in the system, 5% contain a virus, 4% contain HTML code for malicious purposes, 4% contain some malicious script, 2% contain a cryptocurrency miner, and 1% contain ransomware. One percent of the malicious files target the Android OS.
B. DATASET CREATION
We wrote a Java program which creates a dataset (i.e., a dataset creator program). The input for the program is a Java implementation of a feature extraction method. The dataset creator applies the feature extractor (with the desired configuration) on all of the files in a given collection and combines the feature vectors into a final * .CSV dataset. We implemented all of the abovementioned generic feature extraction methods, as well as a feature extractor which extracts the MalJPEG features.
In order to compare the MalJPEG features with features extracted using generic feature extraction methods, we created various datasets. Each dataset represents a specific feature extraction method with a specific configuration.
To accomplish this, we applied our dataset creator program with all of the abovementioned feature extractors and various configurations, on our JPEG image collection, in order to create a collection of datasets.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of MalJPEG in detecting malicious JPEG images, we designed experiments to answer the following research questions: For evaluation purposes, we calculated the true positive rate (TPR) and the false positive rate (FPR) of each classifier.
The TPR and FPR are the most important metrics in our domain of malware detection; a viable detection system must maintain a high TPR (representing the system's ability to successfully detect positive samples -malicious) and a low FPR (the system's capability of avoiding false alarms for negative samples -benign). Note that since our dataset is highly imbalanced, it is extremely important to use the TPR and FPR metrics instead of the well-known accuracy metric, as they represent the classifier's accuracy and false positives for the minority class only, i.e., malicious. Note also that the TPR and FPR are complementary to the true negative rate (TNR) and false negative rate (FNR).
In addition, we measured the area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve, or the AUC, of the machine learning classifiers presented in Section IV-C, trained and tested on different datasets. The ROC curve is created by plotting the true positive rate (TPR) against the false positive rate (FPR) at various threshold settings. In order to achieve a high AUC, a high TPR and low FPR are needed at each threshold. The AUC is a preferred metric (over the accuracy metric) for comparing machine learning algorithms applied on datasets (balanced or imbalanced, binary or multiclass) as suggested by [55] , [56] .
In order to calibrate the threshold (a value between zero and one) that optimizes the classifier's detection results, we needed a metric that integrates the TPR and FPR. Thus, we used the integrated detection rate (IDR) proposed by [3] . IDR = TPR·(1−FPR) = TPR·TNR. As can be seen, theIDR integrates theTPR andFPRmetrics.Since there is a trade-off between the TPR and FPR values, the IDR metric will have a maximum point at which the trade-off between the TPR and the FPR is optimal. The IDR measure makes it easier to identify the optimal point at which the TPR and TNR (1-FPR) are the highest. The well-known F-measure (or F1) metric is not adequate for our purpose of threshold calibration as it lacks the FPR metric. The F-measure is the harmonic mean of the Precision and Recall metrics; Recall is the same as the TPR metric, however Precision is not equal to the FPR metric. The FPR is a very important metric for malware detection systems as it represents the percentage of false alarms. A viable malware detection system must maintain a high TPR with a low FPR. The difference between using the IDR and F-measure for threshold calibration becomes very significant when coping with imbalanced datasets [3] , such as the dataset used in this research.
E. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Our experimental design is aimed at providing clear and practical answers to the abovementioned research questions.
The experiments were performed using the 10-fold crossvalidation configuration (unless otherwise stated), and the fold results were grouped using average function. The crossvalidation setup divides the dataset into training and test sets 10 times; each time the machine learning classifiers are trained on nine folds of the dataset and tested on the remaining fold. That ensures that the results reflect the detection of unknown malicious JPEG images.
Recall that since our collection is extremely imbalanced (just 1.15% malicious instances), the classification problem is much more difficult. In addition, classifiers which are susceptible to imbalanced datasets must be configured, and their threshold must be adjusted in order to achieve their optimal results in terms of TPR and FPR. We evaluated the classifiers with different threshold configurations and only present the results of the threshold which maximizes the IDR (combination of TPR and FPR).
1) EXPERIMENT 1 -COMPARISON OF FEATURES USING MACHINE LEARNING CLASSIFIERS
In this experiment, we compare the detection results of the machine learning classifiers leveraging both MalJPEG features and features extracted using generic feature extraction methods.
First, we apply machine learning classifiers on datasets created using the MalJPEG feature extractor (which extracts the features described in Section IV-A) and different generic feature extraction methods with various configurations. Table 3 presents the configurations that we used for each of the feature extractors. With regard to the generic feature extraction methods, the specific configurations were chosen because previous studies indicated that they were well-suited for use with machine learning for malware detection. For example, the Min-Hash method was found to be effective when using 200 hash functions. We chose to examine different window sizes for different basic units (byte, char). The histogram method was found to work best with a window size = 1024 and stride = 256. Each unique configuration was used to produce a single dataset.
2) EXPERIMENT 2 -COMPARISON OF FEATURE EXTRACTION TIME COMPLEXITY
In this experiment, we compare the MalJPEG feature extractor against the generic feature extraction methods in terms of time complexity. In order make this comparison, we applied all of the feature extractors on each file in our JPEG image collection (156,818) and measured the time it takes for the extractor to extract features from a single image. We compare the average time it takes for each extractor to extract features from files of different sizes.
In order to establish a fair benchmark, we warm up the Java virtual machine (JVM) so that all of the relevant classes are loaded in the cache, and thus can be accessed faster during runtime, equally for all feature extractors. We repeated this experiment five times and average the results.
3) EXPERIMENT 3 -COMPARISON WITH ANTIVIRUS ENGINES
In this experiment, we compare the TPR of leading antivirus engines with the TPR of the classifier that provided the best AUC in Experiment 1. We used the VirusTotal online Web service to obtain a comprehensive analysis of our malicious JPEG image collection, which contains 1,805 images, and their classification based on VirusTotal's 69 antivirus engines. We analyzed the report produced by VirusTotal and calculated the TPR for each engine by dividing the number of images that were recognized correctly as malicious by the total number of malicious images (1,805).
4) EXPERIMENT 4 -REAL-LIFE UNKNOWN MALWARE DETECTION
In this experiment, we tested MalJPEG in a real-life scenario in which the machine learning classifiers are tested only on more recently created files, i.e., instances that come later in time than the instances that the model was trained on.
The rationale behind this experiment is that in real-life, malicious files are created regularly, some of which are new and unknown in terms of the type of threat they pose, the vulnerability they exploit, their malicious way of action, etc. In this experiment, we want to demonstrate MalJPEG's detection capabilities on a dataset that represents this real-life scenario involving unknown instances.
We created a dataset with MalJPEG features and sorted the malicious instances based on the ''First Seen'' field of the VirusTotal report which denotes when the example was first introduced to VirusTotal. The First Seen field is our best indicator of the length of time a malicious JPEG image has been in the wild (i.e., the age of the malicious JPEG image). For the experiment, we derived five different datasets from the original sorted dataset, each of which uses a different percentage of instances to train the model: 50%, 66.6%, 75%, 80%, and 90%. For example, we trained machine learning classifiers on the first X% of the malicious and benign instances, and tested the model on the remaining instances. The lower the training percentage, the more difficult the experiment. In this experiment, we did not use the 10-fold cross-validation setup.
It is important to mention that it is likely that some of the ''newer'' files used to test the model are variants of ''older'' files used to train the model. Since variants of the same malware are assumed to be similar, is it possible that our model was already trained on samples that are similar to ''newer'' samples; thus, the ''newer'' samples are not always completely different from ''older'' ones, and there usually is some similarity between them. Therefore, the first experiment which applied 10-fold cross-validation is still relevant, and the fourth experiment adds a different perspective. Figure 7 presents a comparison between the detection results of the Random Forest classifier, evaluated on datasets created using the histogram methods presented in Table 3 ; we only provide the detection results of the Random Forest classifier, because it outperforms all of the other classifiers used in our experiments on all of the datasets created using the histogram methods. We set the Random Forest threshold to 0.05 (instead of the default of 0.5) to achieve the best results. The results are sorted from the highest to the lowest according to the AUC metric. As can be seen, the best results were achieved using the byte entropy histogram: TPR= 0.805, FPR = 0.05, IDR= 0.765, and AUC = 0.893. Figure 8 presents a comparison between the detection results of the K-Nearest Neighbors classifier evaluated on datasets created using the Min-Hash methods. It is important to mention that the K-Nearest Neighbors classifier is the only classifier to use with Min-Hash datasets, since it is the only classifier that can actually compare Min-Hash signatures using a distance function (see Section IV-B.2; there is no actual order between the Min-Hash signature's numbers, thus regular machine learning algorithms are not effective on it. We used the K-Nearest Neighbors classifier with K = 5 and distance function = Hamming. We set the K-Nearest Neighbors classifier threshold to 0.05 (instead of the default of 0.5) to achieve the highest results. The results are sorted from the highest to the lowest according to the AUC metric. As can be seen, the best results were achieved on the dataset created using Min-Hash based on ten-size byte shingles (TPR = 0.807, FPR = 0.064, IDR = 0.755, and AUC = 0.891), or on ten-size char shingles (TPR = 0.810, FPR = 0.054, IDR = 0.766, and AUC = 0.895). Figure 9 presents the detection results of the machine learning classifiers applied on a dataset containing MalJPEG features. The optimal threshold (the one that maximizes the IDR) for the classifiers is 0.05. The results are sorted from the highest to the lowest according to the AUC metric. As can be seen, the LightGBM classifier achieved the highest AUC = 0.997, with TPR = 0.951, FPR = 0.04, and IDR = 0.948.These results answer the first and the second research questions and show that machine learning-based classifiers that have been trained on MalJPEG features can efficiently detect unknown malicious JPEG images. Table 4 presents a summary of the configurations that provide the best results for all of the abovementioned methods, both generic feature extraction methods and the MalJPEG feature extractor. As can be seen, the best configurations for the histogram and Min-Hash methods provide nearly the same results. However, the LightGBM classifier trained on MalJPEG features provides significantly better detection results in terms of the TPR, FPR, and AUC, with significantly less features required. It is important to clarify that the best detection results of the entropy histogram and Min-Hash methods (presented in Table 4 ) are not bad when considering that our dataset is extremely imbalanced and contains just 1.15% malicious instances. This also emphasizes the superior results obtained with MalJPEG features in comparison to features extracted using the best of the abovementioned generic feature extraction methods.
2) EXPERIMENT 2 Figure 10 presents the average time (in milliseconds) required for each feature extractor to extract features from images in our collection (the y-axis presents the time in milliseconds, and the x-axis presents the file size in KB). As can be seen, as the file size grows, it takes more time for all of the feature extractors to extract the features. One can also see that 1) the slowest feature extractor is Min-Hash (dark blue); 2) the byte entropy histograms behave almost the same (gray and yellow); and 3) the MalJPEG feature extractor (green) is the fastest, and it behaves similarly to the byte and char histogram methods (orange and light blue). Table 5 contains the values presented in Figure 10 for the following file size ranges: 0-1000KB and 7500-9600KB.
3) EXPERIMENT 3 Figure 11 presents a comparison between the TPR achieved by the LightGBM classifier (achieved the best results in Experiment 1) trained on MalJPEG features and the top 12 antivirus engines out of VirusTotal's 69 antivirus engines. As can be seen, our method significantly outperforms all of the leading antivirus engines. Our method achieved a TPR of 0.951, while the most accurate antivirus, Fortinet, had a TPR of 0.823; therefore, our method is ∼15.5% better at the task of malicious JPEG image detection than Fortinet.
It is important to mention that the average TPR of the top 12 antivirus engines (0.73) is relatively low in comparison to VOLUME 8, 2020 the average TPR of the classifiers we used in the previous experiment (0.929). Figure 12 presents the detection results of the LightGBM classifier which provided the best detection results on the five real-world datasets used in this experiment. The results are sorted from the lowest to the highest according to the AUC metric. The LightGBM classifier achieved AUCs between 0.975 and 0.996, TPRs between 0.865 and 0.911, FPRs between 0.001 and 0.09, and IDRsbetween 0.864 and 0.903. As in the first experiment, the optimal threshold for the LightGBM classifier is 0.05. In general, the detection results achieved by each of the classifiers, and LightGBM in particular, are slightly lower (in terms of the AUC and TPR) than the corresponding results of the same classifiers in Experiment 1. Yet, these results still demonstrate that machine learningbased classifiers trained on MalJPEG features can efficiently detect unknown malicious JPEG images in a real-life scenario in which the classifier is tested only on future unknown instances.
4) EXPERIMENT 4
To further analyze the results, we examined the properties of misclassified malicious samples (false negatives), which totaled 16, in order to understand why they were misclassified. We tried to determine whether they have commonalities and if they differ from the samples which were classified correctly (true positives). We found that 13 of the 16 samples contain a Trojan with a backdoor labeled as 'PHP/Agent.VD!tr.bd', two contain an exploit (CVE-2010-0028 and CVE-2012-0897), and one contain a ransomware labeled as 'W32/Ransom.AAN!tr' (the labels and CVEs provided by the Fortinet antivirus engine). However, only the samples which contain exploits are unique to the misclassified samples; the remaining 14 samples contain threats that are also found in the true positive samples. In addition, we did not find any characteristics in the features of the 16 misclassified samples which differentiate them from the true positive samples and could cause the classifier to misclassify them.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present MalJPEG, a machine learningbased solution for efficient detection of unknown malicious JPEG images. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to present a machine learning-based solution tailored specifically for the detection of malicious JPEG images. MalJPEG extracts 10 simple but discriminative features from the JPEG file structure and leverages them with a machine learning classifier, in order to discriminate between benign and malicious JPEG images.
MalJPEG features are extracted based on the structure of the JPEG image. MalJPEG features were defined based on an understanding of how attackers use JPEG images in order to launch attacks and how it affects the JPEG file structure in comparison to regular benign JPEG images. The features are simple and relatively easy to extract statically (without actually viewing the image) when parsing the JPEG image file.
We evaluate MalJPEG in four experiments. For our evaluation, we used a very large collection of 156,818 JPEG images: 155,013 (98.9%) benign and 1,805 (1.15%) malicious, collected between 2016 and 2018 from social media (benign images) andVirusTotal(malicious images). Note that the percentage of malicious images in our collection is extremely low (1.15%). We intentionally prepared our collection that way so the collection reflects, as much as possible, the low percentage of malicious images (compared to benign images) in the real world. Note also that the extremely low percentage of malicious instances (positive) in the collection makes the detection of malicious images in our experiments extremely difficult.
In the first experiment, we compared the detection results of machine learning classifiers evaluated on datasets created using two generic feature extraction methods proposed in previous studies, (histogram and Min-Hash), with various configurations, against MalJPEG features. The results showed that the best configurations of the histogram (byte entropy histogram) and Min-Hash methods provide roughly the same results using the Random Forest classifier: TPR = 0.810, FPR = 0.054, and AUC = 0.895. However, the results of this experiment also showed that the LightGBM classifier trained on MalJPEG features provides improved results: TPR = 0.951, FPR = 0.004, and AUC = 0.997. It is important to emphasize that MalJPEG is capable of providing these significantly better detection results using only 10 features, in comparison to the Min-Hash and histogram methods, which used 200 and 2048 features respectively. These results also prove that MalJPEG features are discriminative, thus allowing machine learning classifiers to distinguish between malicious and benign JPEG images, although the dataset is highly imbalanced.
In the second experiment, we compared the time complexity of the MalJPEG feature extractor to the generic feature extraction methods, for all of the files in our image collection. The results showed that the MalJPEG feature extractor is the fastest (24ms for an average file of 200-300KB) and outperforms all of the other feature extractors.
In the third experiment, we compared MalJPEG based on the LightGBM classifier (which achieved the best detection results in Experiment 1), to 12 leading antivirus engines. The results showed that the TPR of the LightGBM classifier significantly outperforms all of the top 12 antivirus engines in the task of malicious JPEG image detection. The LightGBM classifier is 15.5% better than the most successful antivirus engine in this experiment, Fortinet, which achieved a TPR of 0.823. Bearing in mind that our malicious JPEG collection only contains known threats collected from VirusTotal, this experiment clearly demonstrates the inability of even the leading antivirus engines to detect malicious JPEG images containing known threats. Antivirus engines which are based solely on signatures can only detect known threats if they are constantly and quickly updated with their signatures. In contrast, MalJPEG which is machine learning-based, is able to effectively detect both known and unknown malicious JPEG images.
In the fourth experiment, we tested MalJPEG on five datasets which represent a real-life scenario in which we trained the machine learning model on prior instances (chronologically) and tested the model only on unknown future instances. The datasets differ from each other by the percentage of instances used for model training (50%, 66.6%, 75%, 80%, and 90%); the lower the training percentage, the harder the experiment. The best detection results were achieved by the LightGBM classifier, which obtained AUCs between 0.975 and 0.996, TPRs between 0.865 and 0.911, FPRs between 0.001 and 0.09, and IDRs between 0.864 and 0.903. These detection results are slightly worse than the corresponding results obtained in Experiment 1, yet they still demonstrate that a machine learning-based classifier trained on MalJPEG features can also efficiently detect unknown malicious JPEG images in a real-life scenario in which the classifier is tested on future unknown instances.
Given the threats posed against individuals, businesses, and organizations by cyber attackers using malicious JPEG images, a comprehensive detection method is clearly required. MalJPEG provides efficient detection of known and unknown malicious JPEG images. MalJPEG works relatively fast, thus supporting real-time performance requirements for the detection of large image streams. In addition, MalJPEG can be parallelized easily and scaled to cope with the massive amount of images in the large-scale systems of enterprises. Based on the results of our experiments, it would be valuable to implement MalJPEG, in order to protect organizations, cloud services (e.g., Microsoft Office 365, Google Drive, etc.), social media (Facebook, Instagram, etc.), and their users from malicious JPEG images.
